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Preface 
Effective policy responses to the problenl of desertification must rely on expert advice. The 
ca.uses and consequences of desertificatioil are complex, as are the policy options for thwarting 
desertification. In this context, the demand for expert advice should be high. Yet the negotia- 
tions that led to the United Nations Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD) appear to have 
been little influeilced by experts. The failure is especially marked considering that  the CCD, 
~vllich came into force in December 1996, is now the central legal instrument for combatting 
desertification. 
In this paper, Elisabeth Corell explores some reasoils why expert influence was low. In 
part,  she concludes that the institutioilal a.rrangements for providing expert advice were poorly 
designed-they allowed some experts to pa.rticipate, but in a manner that was largely disconnected 
from the real negotiatioils and did not provide expert illformation on a timely basis. 
Corell conducted the analysis while she was a participant in IIASA's Young Scientists' Sum- 
mer Program (YSSP) in 1996. While a.t IIASA she worked with the project on "Implementation 
and Effectiveness of 1nterna.tional Environlllental Conlnlitnlents (IEC)." 
Abstract 
Desertification is a cornples environmental issue and expert advice should play an important 
role when negotiating an international a.green1ent to deal with the phenomenon. Yet in prac- 
tice, scientific expert influence wa.s illarginal in the development of the Convention to Combat 
Desertification (CCD). This pa.per esplores why. 
It argues that  low scientific expert influence lllainly reflects two factors. First, some Southern 
countries, who were keen to have a. post R.io collvelltioil that focused on developing countries, 
resisted complex scientific advice since it could jeopardize the whole convention. Second, the 
International Panel of Experts on Desertificatioil - the main institution for providing expert 
a.dvice to the negotiations - 1va.s sinall and emerged only late in the process. By the time the 
CCD was to  be negotiated, most of the issues on which experts could have some influence were 
already settled. 
htoreover, the expansion over time of the definition of "desertification" to  a widening range 
of environmental conditions eroded the focus of the concept and made it less useful for policy. 
Donors, who were apprehensive because earlier action plans on desertification had failed, became 
reluctant to  support international a.nti-desertificatioi~ projects. Thus the issue became tied to 
tlle general political debate a.bout developillent a.id. 
Altllougl~ scientific esperts clicl not have lllucl~ influence, other non-governinenta.1 actors who 
participated in the CCD negot.iations were influentiaJ. Tlle a.ctive encourageinent of the partic- 
ipa.tion of 11011-governmental organizations, their long-standing interest and espertise on these 
issues, a.nd honlogeneity of their int.erests a.11 contributed to their influence. That  NGOs had 
illore influence suggests that it is illore importa.nt to  focus on actors who ha.ve issue competence, 
ra.ther than on forndly  appointed scientific esperts, when analyzing the influence of expert 
a.dvice in international environmental agreements. 
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The Failure of Scientific Expertise to Influence the 
Desert ificat ion Negotiations 
1. Studying Expert Influence 
Eilvironillental issues contain natural and socia.1 causes, technical dimensions and political con- 
sequences which tend to be co11flictua.l. Ill'hen considering complicated issues decision-makers 
consult experts in the specific field to get a.ssistance in identifying their interests and policies.[l] 
As a means of coping with environmental inter-linliages, this phenomenon is increasing. The 
role of espert advice in international environmental decision-making has attracted attention in 
connectioil with recent negotia.tions of conventions addressiilg global environmental problems.[2] 
Espertise has an iillportant role to play 11eca.use those who possess relevant knowledge have the 
power to frame the issue under negotiation and evaluate policy options. Experts call help define 
an issue, which has iinportailt bearing for how it is addressed and, consequently, which activities 
and iinpleinentatioil strategies are perceived a.s lnost effective. 
Espert advice is needed beca.use the new international environmental agreements are of a 
preventive charactel.; they call esa.mine wl1a.t inight happen with or without policy action as 
well as the consequences of different policies. The coillplex nature of enviroilmental problems 
inalies it difficult to reach certa,iilty &out the a.ppropria.te preventive courses of action and their 
implica.tions. It is, for insta.nce, difficult to estima.te the long-term effects of reducing pollution. 
These preventive a.nd coinples aspects of environmental problems yield high demand for expert 
advice. 
Ol~servers of internationa.1 environmental a.greements would support the notion that  it is 
desirable t11a.t esperts should esercise infliience on iilternatioilal environn~ental negotiations, 
hoping that  they would provide informatioil ileedetl to rea.ch a suita.ble a.greement. However, 
t,he observed influence of scientists is in fa.ct deba.ted. For instance, an analysis of the role 
of tlle Iiltergoverilillental Panel on C1ima.t.e C:hange (IPCC) suggests that the IPCC seeins to 
have 11a.d considera.ble influeilce because itas first report initiated the negotiations that  led to 
the Frameivorli Convention on Clima.te C:ha.nge (FCCC).[3] As time passed the IPCC becaine 
increasingly distanced from negotiations, suggesting that influence seeins to have beell high in 
the initial stages only to  decline in later sta.ges of the process. This observation raises the 
question: what are the factors t11a.t contribute to the high or low influence of scientific experts 
on negotiations? 
This pa.per esainiiles a case where coilditions were right for experts to  be influential: the 
199:3-1994 negotiations of the Conveiition to Coinbat Desertification (CCD).[4] In practice, 
however, scientific expert influence wa.s low. The paper explores some explanations for why 
this has been tlle case. Several alternatives are esplored. It could be that  fifteen years earlier 
scieiltists had already agreed tl1a.t "desertifica.tion" was a inisleading term when addressing 
dryland problems and therefore felt that ilegotiations under such a heading were improperly 
framed. Or did experts find it difficult not to get eiltailgled in the North-South debate? Perhaps 
tlle iilstitution established to provide expert a.dvice wa.s consciously designed to have low impact, 
or were experts siinply not interestetl in having a.ny influence? These a.re some of the cluestions 
raised and discussed. 
The paper is a case study of tlle CCD, ba.sed on inaterial gathered during negotiatioil sessions. 
It will first deal with the scientific and llisborical b a . ~ l i g r ~ u l ~ d s  to the recent negotiations. These 
*Department of \Va.t,er and E n \ ~ i r o ~ u i ~ ~ e n t a l  St,udies, Linkoping University, S-581 83 Linkoping, Sweden. E-mail: 
elico(@t.ema.li~i.se. 
provide the context within which experts might have influence on the recent negotiations. Next, 
the paper describes how desertification a.ppeared on the Rio political agenda, followed by a 
description of the conditions under whicll experts operated during desertification negotiations. 
Explanations are then provided for why expert influence was low. Finally, influence by others 
not fornlally termed "experts", such as NC:Os, is discussed. 
Experts giving advice on environmental illatters a,re usually assumed to be of scientific train- 
ing. For instance, Sundqvist defines a,n expert a.s (1 scieiztific advisor in political contexts.[5] 
However, the term "expert" is controversial. In today's international environmental negotia- 
tions there are actors other t11a.n scientists who can contribute relevant knowledge. While this 
paper is limited to the analysis of scientific expertise, it will briefly discuss the influence of rep- 
resentatives from non-governmental organizations, and suggest the need for focusing on actors 
wit11 issue competence rather than fornla~lly a.ppointed scientific experts when studying expert 
advice in international environinental negotiations. 
2. Causes of Desertification 
Accounts of horn productive laad 1va.s being lost to tlle desert call be found as early as 2400 BC 
in hilesopotamia.[G] In recent years aktention 1va.s directed towards the conditions in dryland 
a,rea.s when population increase conlbined with serious droughts resulted in staggering poverty. 
Drought-stricken, predominantly African, countries received international attention and devel- 
opment aid to prevent drought cata.strophes from reoccurring. 
According to Agenda 21 desertification affect's allout one sixth of the world's population, 70 
percent of all drylands and one quarter of the total la.nd area in the world.[7] Impacts of the 
phenolnenon include degradation of ra.ngela.nds, degradation of irrigated cropland, decline in soil 
fertility and soil structure, a,nd poverty. The problenl is most severe in countries on the margins 
of the Saha.ra in Africa., but also affect,s Asia., Europe, Australia and Latin and North America. 
In 1949 tlle French geogra.pl1er And+ Xul~reville coined the scientific concept of "desertifi- 
ca.tionn by sta,ting t11a.t "(t)here a.re rea.1 deserts being born today, under our very eyes, in areas 
where the annual ra.infal1 is bet~veen 'TOO and 1500 mm."[S] The vision of sprea,ding deserts 
alrea.dy existed among colonial scientists, but t,he first quantified assessinent of expansion came 
in 1972, when the United Sta'tes Agency for International Development (USAID) claimed that 
"there 11a.s been a net adva,nce in solne pla'ces along a 2000-mile southern front of a.s much as 30 
llliles a, year." [9] 
In the la.te sisties and early sevent,ies a.cut,e droughts in Western and Eastern Africa attracted 
global a.ttention.[lO] At the saine t,iine, desertifica,tion became a generally accepted phenomenon 
a,nd concrete figures were often cit.ed of 1101~ much deserts expanded every yeas.[ll] Since then 
nulllerous resea,rch projects on tlle ca,uses of desertification have been conducted, but there are 
also t,llose who cluestion wlletller tlle problem existed at  al1.[12] 
Tlle lively scientific deba.te became pola.rized during the seventies and a review of the usage 
of tlle concept in the literature illustra.tes the estent of tlie controversy by identifying over a 
llulldred desertification defiaitions.[l3] There a.re a,lso related phenomena sucl-1 as desertization, 
desert encroachment, desert creep, and expandillg desert, which have been used as synonymous 
wit11 desertification by some.[l4] 
It becomes apparent that when discussing dryland issues and the definition of desertification, 
it is inlportant to ma.ke distinctions between some closely linked processes which are often 
confused. Drought is a period of one or two yea,rs with rainfall well below average, desiccation a 
process of a.ridification resulting froill a. dry period lasting on the order of decades, and dryland 
rlcgrccdcrtion. bl.ougllt about ma.inly by inetllods of la,ild use in delicate environmental conditions, 
involving a, decrease in tlle productivity of vegeta.tion aad soils.[l5] Desertifica.tion has been 
described a.s patches of land in dry conditions tha.t join together, like a rash on llulnan skin.[l6] 
Today inany scientists would agree t l ~ t  t,he t,erlll lancl degradation is most useful to describe the 
results of deteriorating processes and tlle tern1 desertificcldion to define dry ecosysteills which 
have turned into a desert. 
Tlle central issue in tlle coiltest of tlle iilternational negotiations, however, seems to  be 
~vhether desertification is man-nla.de or not, since t11a.t determines whether public policy aimed 
a t  cllanging huinan behavior, including interilatioilal programs and agreements, would be use- 
ful. \TIhen organizing the scientific deba,t,e from that a.pproacl1 the following three perspectives 
emerge. 
The first viewpoint is tlmt desertification is illa,inly tlle result of adverse human impact.[l7] 
It is tlle transforination of a la,ndsca.pe to reseillbling a desert. Tlle supporters of this view 
regard the role of short-term climate fluctua.tions and droughts as catalytic rather than causal 
for desertification. 
A second idea is that climatic varia.tion espla.ins desertification.[l8] Drylands are resilient 
and will return to  rapid increases in productivity following good rains after natural drought. 
Fluctuations in vegetative bioinass inay be explained by fluctuations in rainfall. The human 
influeilce is thus uncertain and droughts will reoccur because they are "natural". 
A synthesis perspective, is t,llat human impa.ct combined with climatic phenomena cause 
clesestifica.tion.[l9] Scientists argue t11a.t clima.te alone callnot destabilize the environinent in arid 
lands. The causes of desertifica.tion a.re na.tura1 forces, through periodic stresses of extreme and 
persistent climatic events such a.s tlrought, and humaa use and abuse of sensitive a,nd vulnerable 
dryland ecosystems. The esteilsion of irriga,ted areas and improper land-use practices have led 
to salinization. Damage occurs mlleil human illisuse of land combines with the occurrence of 
drought. Supporters of this view cla,iill t11a.t 1~uma.n political and economic systenls have been 
una,l~le to  cope with recent clima.tic fluctua.tions and that  not oilly tecl~i~ological solutioils are 
needed, but political will. 
Discussions on the ca,uses of desertifica,tioli lnve iillportant policy iinplications and the deba,te 
is deeply entrenched wit11 an awa.reness of t11a.t fact. How these issues spill into ea,cll other is, 
for inst.a.nce, exenlplified 11s t,lle a~rgunient by one of t,lle supporters of the man-made view who 
cla,iills t11a.t desertifica.tioi1 in Africa. is clue t,o tlle brea.cl1 of isolation around the year 1950 for 
ilonladic pastoral societies by interaction with foreign ecoilonlic systems. This led to population 
grourt,l~ aad livestock increa,se, ~vhich in turn let1 to la,ck of driillting water. This constra.int was 
overridden by the supply of perllla'nent wa't,er from la,rge numbers of new wells and this usa.ge 
of wa.ter led to  serious drougllts between 1969 aad 1975. When development aid was given to  
inlprove the situatioil in the affected a.rea.s it supported an unsustainable system and caused 
another series of drougllts in the ea,rly 19SOs.[20] 
This esenlplifying standpoint, forinulated by a. desertification expert, includes a number of 
politically controversia.1 observa.tions. It is ea.sy to see tlmt it is difficult for desertification experts 
not. to get involved in or to avoid 11a.ving their a,rguilleiits used in a inore general political debate. 
Tlle eilviroilnlental issue of tlesertifica.tioi1 11a.s social, political and economic facets, and is not 
liinited to the developing world or tlle poorest people. But it was crises in Africa that  became 
tlle focus for coilcern and inspired the United Nations to initiate international action.[21] 
3. The United Nations Conference on Desert ificat ion 
(UNCOD) 
The iilternational attention attracted by drougllts in Africa in the late sixties and early seventies 
led to  tlle United Nations Confereilce to Coinbat Desertification (UNCOD), held in 1977 in 
Nairobi, Iienya, wllich esanliiled tlle glol~al plle~loinenon of degradation of the environment and 
tlle tlecline of biological protlnctivity in and around arid lands.[22] 
The nlost iillportant outcoille was tlle 11011-binding Plan of Action to Combat Desertificatioil 
(PACD). Tlle docuineilt included recoilllnendations for national and regional action, interna- 
tional action and cooperation, iillnlediate initial action, and implementation of the Plan. Its 
~ll t imate objective was "to sustain and promote, within ecological limits, the productivity of 
arid, semi-arid, sub-humid and other a.rea.s vulilerable to desertification in order to improve the 
quality of life of their inhabitants."[23] 
The goal was to inlpleineilt the PACD by tlle year 2000. The seven-year period 1978 to  1984 
was cllosen for the iinplenlentatioil of iininediate action required and it was suggested that  at  
the end of that  period a first general a.ssessinent of progress could be made. The responsibility of 
followiilg up and coordinatiilg tlle implementation of the Plan of Action was given to UNEP.[24] 
IINCOD successfully pla.ced desertifica.t,ion on the interilational environmenta,l agenda. In 
fa,ct, it inay be t,lle first of tlie big environnlental issues, a.ttra,cting international public attention 
loilg before global warming, the ozone hole and a.cid ra,in.['25] Despite this, the Plan of Action was 
1la.rdly implemented. It llas been criticized for taliing a fragmented approach to desertification 
and overlooliing socio-economic aspects by ma.inly suggesting action in the form of large-scale 
tecl~nological fixes. The PACD seenled to trigger debate rather than action and was more of a 
statement of good intent, or a sllopping list, tllall an international agreement seriously intended 
to be implemented on an interna.tiona1 level. A 1990 evaluation of the PACD stated that  the 
main ca.use of its failure was the lacli of political coinmitmeilt by both affected countries and 
donors.[26] 
Another reason for the fa,ilure of tlle PACD was a inisjudgement of the resources available, 
1)a.sed on the a.ssumption that  the developed world would make resource and technology transfers 
to developillg countries to help tackle problems it did not feel threatened by.[27] 
Despite international efforts, a't the end of the iinmediate action period in 1984 UNEP's 
Esecutive Secretary Tolba ha'd to coilclude that tlle initiative had been a failure.[28] Eight years 
la,ter the issue would a.gadn emerge on the iilterila,tional agenda a t  the Rio Earth Summit, this 
time resulting in tlle ilegotiatioil of the bincliilg Convelltion to Combat Desertification (CCD). 
4. The Desertification Concept and its Definition 
A lessoil from tlie UNCOD esperience. is that in orcler for an agreement to be implemented, 
not only a.re money a,nd  commitment^ inlporta'nt, but it is also essential to lnve agreement on 
how the problem is perceived. Tlle view of t'lle issue is epitomized in its definit,ion; thus how 
desert.ifica.tion is defined is a key issue in understanding how tlle problem is being addressed a.nd 
a, point for political struggle for those ivith va.rying vested interests. Experts consulted on the 
choice of definition thus lmve a.n inlportaiit role to play. 
It, is t,llerefore interestiilg to esamine t,lle evolution of tlle desertification definitioil in the inter- 
na.tioi1a.l contest. A historical survey sllows llow the emphasis on the importance of the impacts 
(soils aad vegetation versus econonlic a.ncl social) and tlle causal factors (man versus climate) 
varies greatly between a,utllors.[29] 
Regarding the perception of ca.usa1 fa.ctors there has been a "shift in focus from drought as 
t,lle ca.use, in tlle pre-UNCOD discussions, tllrough equal prominence being attached to  humans 
and climate (during and subsequent to UNCOD), to the doiniilailt view today of people as the 
ma,in ca.use of desertificatjon."[30] According to the UNCOD Plan of Action "(d)esertification 
is tlle diininutioil or destruction of the biological potential of the land, and can lead ultimately 
to desert-like conditions. It is an a.spect of the widespread deterioration of ecosystems, and has 
tliiniilislled or destroyed the 1)iologica.l potential, i.e. plant and animal production, for multiple 
use purposes a t  a time wllell increasecl protluctivity is needed to support growing populatiolls 
i11 quest, of tleveloprnent."[:3:1] hlucll inlport.a.nc~e is a.t,ta.clled here to the biological dinleilsioil of 
t lle prol~lem. 
I11 the saine Plan of .4ction it 1i:a.s a.lso stressed t.llat "(i)t is generally incorrect to envision tlle 
process a.s an a.dva.nce of the desert frontier engulfing usa.ble land on its perimeter: the advancing 
sa.nd tlune is in fact a very special and localized case."[32] This inlplicitly indicates that  if the 
desertification coilcept is associated with wandering sand dunes, it is not appropriate to use 
when addressing world-wide dryland inana.gen~ent problems, which was the aim of UNCOD. 
\Vhile some criticize the use of the term in the coiltext of international negotiations for causing 
inuddled thinl<ing, it has also beell suggested that it was a stroke of political genius to include 
"desertification" in the title of UNCOD.[33] The term was used to market the phenomenon on 
the iilterilatioilal political stage. 
In 1990 a UNEP espert ineetiilg a.doptec1 a, new definition: "Desertification/Land degrada- 
tion, in the contest of a.ssessment, is laad degra.da.tion in a.rid, semi-arid and dry sub-humid 
areas resulting froill adverse llumaa impa.ct." It is notable that the phenomenon was defined 
a.s man-made by experts from aa institution which had vested interest in such an interpreta- 
tion, since UNEP was in charge of iillpleilleiltiilg the Action Plan. However, over the next year 
"land degradation" and "in the coiltest of assessment" were dropped and it was added that  
desertification was the result of "mainly" a.dverse human impact.[34] 
Tlle modified UNEP definitioil provided the basis for the CCD definition, settled for at the 
Eartll Summit, where the decisioil wa.s ina.cle to negotiate the Convention. Yet, other causes 
were added to it: "Desertification ineans laad degrada.tion in a.rid, semi-arid, dry sub-humid 
a.reas resulting from various factors, iilcludiilg cliillatic variations and human activities."[35] 
Desertifica.tion call thus have many ca.uses, bnt, t,lle illain ones are climate and man. This 
cllailged defiilition provides an esa.iuple of the syilthesis perspective meiltioiled in Section 2. 
4 .2  Using the desertificatioil coilcept 
Despite coilflictiilg interpretatioils of the coilcept and demands to abandon it for alternatives to  
better reflect tlle coinplesities of dryland probleills, the term desertification stubbornly remains 
in use. This inay have to do wit,h the fact t,ha.t "desertification" quickly became a catch phrase 
and its ~ueailing was transferred to include a series of probleins in drylands. In the past few years, 
mai1.y writers have argued that, the t,erill should be aba.ndoned on the grounds that it combiiles 
t,oo many different processes nlllicll need to be distiilguished and dealt with separately.[36] For 
esa.mple, the term currently includes tlle saliilizatioil of land within irrigation systems, which is 
a very clifferent kind of probleill fro111 that of soil erosioil in dryland areas. Since 1954, the term 
11a.s also been widened from arid and semiarid lands to cover probleins of degradation in the sub- 
humid zone.[37] This espansioil allows for a larger group of couiltries to benefit froin possible 
fortllconli~lg interna.tiona1 a.ssistance.[3S] It 11a.s beell suggested that the plethora of definitions 
aad the iilclusio~l of a growiilg ilunlber of geographic a.reas may be results of attempts to mobilize 
es t ra  fuildiilg for desertificatioil and increase t,he ilumber of poteiltial beneficiary nations.[39] 
In the public mind, and in that of illany decision-maliers, desertificatioil and desert advance 
coiltiilue to be confused. Tlle iillage of advancing sand duiles is powerful, despite the lack of 
clear evidence for its support. \Vorli froin the Sudan[40] shows the absence of such advance, 
in the sense of shiftiilg sand dunes. Instea.d, it is showil that patterns of vegetation are highly 
tlepeildeilt on rainfall, so that the desert "a.dvancesn and "contracts" depending on precipitation 
in a given year. 
To conclude, the concept of desertificatioil is today often used in a dramatic, emotional 
coiltest to maximize people's a.t tention and focus on humans, rat her than the landscape. [41] 
It ma,y now be more of a burden thail an a.id in understanding the phenomenon. Researching 
desertification is a coinples matter which does not oilly include the strictly scientific discussion 
on the ca.uses of the pl~enomenon, but also 11a.s iinplications that may lead to involvement in 
a.11 intricate and politicized development policy debate. It is in this light we inust study the 
activities of esperts involved in the international ilegoliatioils to combat desertification. 
5 .  Desertification on the Rio Agenda 
Desertification caine oilto the interna.tiona1 agenda, in the iniddle of the seventies, and arguments 
fro111 the 1977 UNCOD ilegotiations were recycled to be used again in the Agenda 21 agreement 
achieved at  the United Nations Conference on Eilviroilment and Development (UNCED), held 
1992 in Rio de Janeiro in Brazil. 
After substantial debate, drought and desertification issues were included as chapter 12 of 
Agenda. 21. During prepara.tions for UNCED African deinailds for a desertifica.tion fund became 
politically lilllied to the deforesta.tioi1 issue. Develol~ed couiltries were pressing for a deforestation 
convention, while developing countries wanted one for desertification. The European Community 
(EC) and the US referred to  the fa.iled PACD and doubted whether desertification, in their eyes 
a, cluster of local environmental issues, was a problem suited for a global convention. As a 
solutioil a package deal, where developing couiltries agreed to  a deforestation convention and 
developed countries to  a desertification convention, was reached.[42] 
But in Rio this deal proved difficult to  operationalize. African countries, supported by the 
reillailling developing world, forcefully pushed the desertification issue against resisting devel- 
oped countries. The turning point ca.me wheil the US agreed to support the proposal and 
pressure beca.ine too strong for the EC t,o resist. -4 chapter on Combatiilg Desertification and 
Drought wa.s iilcluded in Agenda. 21, a.nd on 10 Juile 1992 UNCED requested that  the UN Gen- 
eral Asseillbly should establish a.n intergovernmenta.1 coillmittee for negotiating a collvention on 
desertifica~tion. [43] 
Within a year, the Uilited Nations General Assembly had established the Intergoverilineiltal 
Negotiating Conlillitt,ee for the Ela.bora.tion of an International Convention to  Combat Deserti- 
ficat,ion (INCD) a.nd negot,iat,ions were ander 1va.y. 
6.  The Convention to Combat Desertification (CCD) 
The detailed story of the negotiatioils is told elsewhere.[44] Suffice it t o  say here that  the 
C:onveiltion to  Co1nba.t Desertification[45] (CC'D) 1va.s negotiated during five sessioils from May 
1993 to June 1994, when the Col~vention was concluded in Paris. The CCD entered into force 
in December 1996 and the first Conference of the Pa.rties (COP) to the Convention is planned 
for September-October 1997. 
6.1 The negotiations[46] 
X ~na.jor elelllent in the negotia.tions wa.s tlie special role for Africa, indicated in the title of 
the Convention. As mentioned, in Rio Xfrica.11~ pushed for the Convention, supported by the 
renlaining developing countries of tlie Group of 77 and China. However, when the negotiations 
were laui~ched, a split in the group a.ppea.red. At the first session a proposal to negotiate a 
regional iilstruilleilt for Africa., as an a.ddition to  the Convention, was resisted because Latin 
Ainerican and Asiaa delegates insist>ed tlmt iilst,ruilleilts for other regions should be negotiated 
si~nulta~neously. During the negotiatioil process representatives of countries with ecoiloinies in 
traasition stressed that they were also affected and insisted that  language be included that  
especially noted those countries. 
The a.rguinents supported by those who uranted to give priority to  Africa were brought 
into question by those who pointed out that a.ttention should be given to  other parts of the 
world. or the Conveiltioil would not, he globa.1 and wa.s thus unlikely to  receive support from 
count,ries in regions other than -4frica. \Vllile t-his disa.greement rea.ppeared at  crucial stages in 
tlle process, ilegotiators finally settled for four regional iillplenlentation ailneses for Africa, Asia, 
Latin America aad the Caribbean, and tlle Northern Mediterranean. In accordance with the 
title of t,lle CCD, special attelltioil 1va.s also devoted to  the African region by the adoptioil of 
resolutions on urgent action for Africa a.nc1 interiill a.rrangements for the period between adoption 
of tlle Convention and its entry into force.[47] 
Anotller controversy wa.s related to  financial resources and mechanisms. Developing, pre- 
tlonliilantly African, countries caine to  tlle negotiations hoping that the CCD could provide new 
aad additional financial resources and i~lstitutioils to  llandle them, but the OECD countries 
preferred to  increase the efficiency of existing a.id flows. Afraid of establishing new institutioils 
tlmt would a.dd to  aa  increasing international burea.ucra.cy, they pointed t o  tlle already existing 
operational nlecl~anisms. ~~nt ler ly ing these issues wa.s the polarized international situation in the 
ea.rly 1990s, where the South is I~ogged down by underdevelopnlent and the Nortll preoccupied 
~ v i  t h  tlle socio-economic probleills of recession. 
Lively discussions, organized a.long the North-South divide, prevailed and intense informal 
co~lsultations had to  be uildertalien in the 1a.ter sta.ges of the negotiating process. However, at 
the fifth and last sessioil there wa.s still no final solution to  the critical financial issues, which 
remain for clarification by ilegotiators during the interi~n period and for the COP. 
During the process neg~t ia~tors  a.greed that inlplelllentable commitments on national, regional 
and internatioilal levels were central to the Convention, and stressed the need for a bot tom-up 
a.pproa.cl1, public awa.reness, education, coopera.tio11, and coordination between donors, the North 
aad the South, and South aad South. The idea of explicitly listing countries belonging in the 
categories "affected couiltry pa.rtiesX and "developed country parties", which are to  undertake 
certain obligations under Para.gra.pl1s 5 and 6 of the CCD, was finally abandoned. 
6.2 The key features of the CCD 
The ClClD is a frameworli convent~ion, aad dea.1~ with an environmenta.1 issue that  is a. inajor 
conceril of developing countries. It is chara.cterized as breaking new ground in international 
enviroililleiltal law.[4S] Its uniclueness in conlparison to other related conventions, such a.s the 
Fralneworli Clonveiltioil on Clinla.t,e Change aatl t,he Conr:ent,ion on Biological Diversity, lies in 
its "bott,om-up" a.pproa.ch. 
This approach is devot,ed t.o a.ddressing t.he degra.dation of fragile drylands by involving tlle 
people in the a.ffected areas, and thlls: underliiles the involveillent of local populatioils in the 
tlevelopilleilt of na.tiona1 action progranls for tlle i~llpleillentation of the CCD. The iilclusion of 
t,lle "11ott.0111-up" approach is aa  a . c c o ~ ~ ~ p l i s l ~ ~ ~ ~ e i ~ t  since for developing countries' goverililleilts 
tlle environnlent issue usually ta.kes second yla.ce to  eco~loinic considerations in a traditionally 
"top-do~vn" driven process. Agencies and 1a.w are esta.blished, but without popular pressure, 
ellforcelllent and/or local support,, t,llese activities seldoill bear fruit.[49] 
Tlle Convention takes an innova.tive a.pproac11 by stressing the physical, biological and socio- 
econoillic a.spects of desertifica.t,ion, a.s well a.s t,he inlportance of redirecting techilology transfer 
so t.llat it  is de~lland driven. The core of t,he CCD is the development of national, regional 
ant1 subregional a.ction prograins to com11a.t desertification. These action programs are to  be 
(leveloped by na.tiona1 goverililleilts in cooperatioil with donors, local populations and NGOs.[50] 
Under the Conveiltioil the Parties a.gree to collect, analyze and exchange illformation and 
da.ta to  help uilderstand and assess the processes and effects of drought and desertification 
(Article 16), and pronlote technical aad scientific cooperation (Article 17). In Article 24 the 
Coilvention establishes a Coillnlittee of Science aad Technology, which will provide information 
and advice on scientific and tecl~nological ma.tters to  the COP. The COP can also appoint ad lloc 
pa.nels t,o provide a.dvice, and e s p e r t , ~  on such pa.nels will be taken from a roster of independeilt 
experts, ilonlinated by the Parties to tlle CICD. 
7. Why the Experts Failed to Influence 
The arguillent of this pa.per is that the scientific esperts involved in the CCD negotiations failed 
t,o liave significa.nt influence, altllough they were iiivolved in the process and potentially could 
have had considerable impact on the negotiated outcomes. This section considers the conditions 
under which the esperts operated and tlleil explores several propositions to  why experts were 
inarginalized in the desertificatioil negotiations.[51] 
The role and place of experts in the desertification negotiations seems evident. The nego- 
tiating body was the ilegotiating committee, INCD, with national delegations as members and 
liN a.gencies and NGOs a.s observers. The C!oill~nittee was guided in its work by a Chairman, 
assisted by a Burea .~ ,  and a Secreta.riat. handling the logistics of the negotiations. The central 
mechanisin for espert advice in the desertifica.tioi1 ilegotiations wa.s the Internatioilal Panel of 
Esperts 011 Desertification (IPED).  
In collaboration with releva.nt UN a.gencies, the Executive Secretary appointed experts to 
the diverse geographical and multi-disciplina.ry Paile1.[52] They provided scientific knowledge 
in the form of presentatioils a t  the initial sta.ges of negotiations, reports, and by answering 
questions from the INCD and helping the Secretariat in the preparation of documents. The 
esperts were 15 to 16 in number and prepa.ra.tory Panel meetings were held in Geneva, six weeks 
in advance of the ilegotiating sessioils of the INCD. The Panel convened during the preparations 
for aad during the negotia.tions of the C!onvention and its mandate expired in December 1994, 
sis lnollths after the CCD was concluded and just before the first interim session of the INCD. 
It should be stressed that the Panel 1va.s international, not intergovernmental, and its members 
mere able to act independently.[.53] 
Thus, if scientific advice wa.s readily a.va.ilable during the process of negotiating the CCD, 
what 1va.s it that  prevented esperts froiu having influence? The rest of Section 7 is devoted to  
t,his question. 
7.1 The  science and nature of desertificatioil 
One esplanation could ha.ve to (lo ~vith the science of the desertifica.tion problem. This espla- 
na.tion has two fa.cets. The first 11a.s t,o (lo with possible inadequate research on desertification. 
The core of the ma.tter in the interi1a.tiona.l coiltest is to determine whether the pheilo~nenon is 
ca.used by 1 ~ u m a . n ~  or not. This is important, 1)eca.use if it is caused by climatic variations and 
t,llere is no huina~l impa.ct, it becoines less tllail evitlent t11a.t esteilsive international negotiations 
and resources should be al1ocat)ed t,o the prevent.ion of a. problem which, in the strict meaning, 
ca.nnot be prevented. [54] 
Tlle scientific deba.te on desertifica.tion disp1a.y~ a, range of varying arguments on the causes 
of the phenomenon and consequently a.lso on remedies and implications for policy. However, 
despite occasional calls for additiona.1 resea.rc11 during CCD negotiations, the scientific debate 
reitera.ted in Sections 2 and 4 il1ustra.t.e~ t11a.t desertifica.tion is a well investigated topic, studied 
for several deca.des. If resea.rcl1 on desert>ifica.t,ion had been inadequate or defective there would 
l)e rea.son to  believe t11a.t espert advice would be taliell lightly in the negotiations, but the 
prevention of desertification was a well-defined issue of preventive character and therefore ripe 
for espert advice on the a.ppropriate dryland ma.nagement and implementation strategies. 
Another facet is that  the technical nature of desertification could be so complex that  espert 
a.dvice would get coiltradictory and consequently be overlooked by confused decision-makers. 
Desertifica.tion is indeed a manifold a.nd often site-specific problem, but multiple methods of 
prevention have been developed in va.rious pa.rts of the world and it would be inaccurate to 
a.rgue that  the problem is so technically complica.ted that nothing could be done. Common 
a.pproa.ches to a diversified problem caa be identified, a.s was shown in the PACD. Esperts could 
have ample contributions t,o ma,lie on this point in negotiations. Hence, inadequate research or 
the technical na.ture of the clesertificat,iou 1)rol)lem could not have impaired esperts from ha.ving 
iilfluence on negotiations. 
7.2 The l a c k  o f  expert i n t e r e s t  
A second explailatioil iilvolves the expert interest. The pertinent question here is: were experts 
interested in getting involved aad providing a.dvice to the negotiations? In most studies of 
expertise in illternatioilal ilegotiatioils it is a.ssumed that  the answer is "yes". To address this 
question it is illuminating to collsider the historical background of this process. 
During the rise of the green coilsciousness in the late eighties and early nineties, interna- 
tional negotia,ting processes were combiiietl \\;it,ll the iilternationalization of public opinion. It 
lla,s been suggested that internat,ional environiilental negotia,tions also call enta.il some liind of 
iiiternationalizatio~l of knowledge conseiisus.[5.5] Along these lines, it is probable that  already 
in the seventies, in collnection with the polarization of the scientific debate and during the thor- 
ough scientific preparations[56] for the negotiations of tlle 1977 UNCOD, a kind of international 
scientific consensus on the issue emerged. Experts met and had substantive discussions on what 
they illeant by desertification, with the scientific coinpollent of the Plan of Action to Combat 
Desertification as a result. 
IVlle11 negotiatioiis on tlie issue were resunled in the nineties there was a likely fatigue among 
experts, who ha,d once alrea.dy dealt with the issue on the international level and perhaps even 
were disappointed by the lacli of irnl~lementa.tion of the PACD. Wary of how the issue was 
infested by the developmelit a.id tleba.te, they ma,y have anticipated their lacli of influence since 
negotia,t.ions uiider the hea,ding of "desertifica.tion" were seen as mainly a vehicle for political 
interests. 
Experts nlay also have lost interest in llegotiations if they did not support the definitioil 
aiid thought they were unable to a.ffect it. At the first session of tlle negotiations, one of the 
two IPED members who inade preseiltatioils empliasized the need to redefine desertification,[57] 
but the tlefinition of desertifica.tion was never uiider ally serious threat to be changed during 
the negotiations. Tliis suggests t11a.t ilegotiators settled for the already accepted definition not 
to  reopen the scientific discussioil and to get on with negotiations. However, the definition 
ma,y also ha.ve reflected a scientific consensus, despite tlle IPED member's plea for redefinition, 
a.nd col~sequeiltly there moult1 be no ileetl for a. cliange. It may also be the case that  experts 
a.nd ilegotiators had lea,rlled to live wit.11 t,he defiiiitioll and decided to tolerate tlia,t actors with 
va,rying interests atta,ch different mea,nings to it. 
The la,cl< of expert interest as an esplana.tion for the nzarginalization of expert is interesting, 
but 1ia.s no substantive support a.nd co~ild benefit froiii further investigation. 
7.3 The p o l i t i c i z a t i o n  o f  expert a d v i c e  
A third explanation could l)e the politicization of expert advice. This explanation also has two 
facets. The first is the effects of regioi~al/tlomestic politics. One of the main reasons why the 
iillpleilleiitation of tlie 1977 PACD fa.iled was tlie assuillption t1la.t the problem could be solved 
1%-it.11 technica.1 fixes. Dra,wiiig on t11a.t failure, tlie 1993-4 negotiations focused on the iinportance 
of socio-economic fa.ctors, and especially allout the pa,rticipation of those affected and the neces- 
sity of a, bottom-up approa.ch, if impleli~enta.tioii of the a.greement was to be achieved. Developed 
couiltries based their arguments on es~)eriences froin decades of failed development aid projects, 
but also indirectly tried to inalie developing countries adopt democratic reforms. In this con- 
text, developing countries who were appreliensive to give up any of their independence to earlier 
colonia.1 powers or allow even lnore influence froin already doinineering outside actors, may have 
seen it a.s siding with the North when experts supported the bottom-up strategy. Experts were 
tliereby stressing tlie i inp~r t~ance of eiiipo~vermeiit of politically marginalized peoples affected 
114' desertifiation, wlio could potentially t1irea.teii tlie elites in power in developing counties. 
This explanatioll may partly l ~ e  true. NC4O representatives a t  the conference suspected that 
in soille African countries the a.uthorita.rian governilleilts saw tlle NGO support fos local empow- 
erment a.s a t1irea.t to tlieir power.[.5E] However, it is also true that there was a coilsensus already 
from t,lie first sessioil on tlie need for a bottom-up approach including tlie reillforceinelit of local 
participation and action, NGO activities, the full pa.rticipation of women and tlie significance of 
indigellous technologies and practices.[59] There is thus not adequate support for stating that 
experts were a.ffected by regioi~a.l/domestic politica.1 considerations. 
A second facet of the sa.me explanation is the North-South political context of the negoti- 
a.tioiis. Because of tlie interi1a.tiona.l political situatioil in the seventies, when nuinerous newly 
independent African countries were struck l)y serious droughts and Western countries expanded 
development aid programs, desertifica~tioii 1)eca.ine intertwined with the politics of development 
policy. As one of the issues on the North-South agenda the desertification concept reemerged 
wheii the UNCED decision wa.s made to negotiate about dryland issues. 
Desertification was recycled in UNCED as an environmental topic for developing countries 
to balance the conventioils on climate change a,nd biodiversity, issues mainly preoccupying de- 
veloped countries.[GO] Despite the 1977 PACD observation that  it is improper to couple deserti- 
fica.tion and desert advance, the inelllory of tlie international attention desertification attracted 
in the seventies must have made it teinpting use the iinage again. It has been suggested that  
inany Africa.n delegatioils wa.nted to crea.te a, convention that focused on development aid, that 
would bring about new a.nd additiona,l resources in spite of donor fatigue, and not an agreement 
tl1a.t mould focus on the scientific issue.[61] 
As noted earlier, during negotia~tions in Rio, \Vestern countries tended to see desertification as 
a pa,tterii of local environmental problems tliat were iinpossible to address in a unitary manner. 
111 this light, developing country delegations inay have associated expert advice stressing the 
coillplexity and site-specificity of the issue with the position of the North, because it would 
seeillingly dilute the a.rgument for a, global convent,ion. There was thus an incentive to prevent 
experts from giving advice t11a.t would complica.te the matter. This fear was reinforced when non- 
African illeillbers of the Group of 77 and China. (a.s described in Section 6) a t  regular intervals 
in the ilegotiatioils insisted tliat a.ttention should be given to non-African geographical regions 
a.s well, or else the global na.ture of t,he cIC!D, a,nd thus the need for the agreement itself, would 
I)e called in question. This issue a.rose alreatly during the first negotiating session.[62] 
I11 R.io, a definition of desert,ifica.t~ion was a.greed on a.s described in Sectioil 4.1. Tlie decision 
on w1ia.t the Convention would concern 1va.s consequently made long before the scientific expertise 
engaged to a,dvise tlie 1993-4 tlesertifica.t.ion negotia.tions could have a say about how to perceive 
a.nd a,ddress the problem. M'hile at  tlie very first da,y of the first session of negotiations, a 
developing country delegate discoura,ged a.ny a.ttempts a.t redefining it,  the Agenda 21 definition 
of desertifica.tion was never seriously challenged.[63] With the problem already defined, a inajor 
a.venue for potential expert influence wa.s lost. This provides part of an explanation as to why 
experts were inarginalized, but ca,nnot l)e the single reasoil why they lacked influence. Despite 
tlie pre-decided definition, experts could lmve ma.de significant contributions on, for instance, 
tlie design of preventive mea.sures. 
Consequently, expert advice wa.s not a.ffected by regional/domestic political considerations, 
but as we have seen in Sections 2 a,nd 4, the a.dvice of desertification experts have inlplications 
for development a,id policy. There were countries who saw the Convention as a political means in 
the North-South conflict over develop~llent a.id a,nd wlio wanted to refrain scientific experts from 
influeilcing the issue with scientific complexities. This contributes to explaining why experts 
1la.d low influence. 
7.4 The iilstitutioil for expert advice 
X fourth expla.na.t~ion iilvolves t,lie iiistit~ubioil for expert a,dvice, the International Pailel of Experts 
on Desertifica.tion (IPED). Since the scient,ific experts ca.me into the picture at  the s a n e  time 
a.s tlie c.oilveiltioil worli wa.s being la.unchet1, there was iiot much time to make preparations 
for the provision of scientific .advice. The IPED meetings were held in Geneva in a,dvance of 
tlie negotia.ting sessions, so tlie ~legobiating coinillittee (INCD) was unable to put questions 
concerning scientific issues under negotia.tion directly to the Panel as they arose during the 
negotiations. The Secretariat forwarded questions and answers between the INCD and IPED, 
11a.ving a role similar to an interpreter's.[G4] 
There was only direct coinillunication at  the information sharing segment of the first session 
wllen two esperts from the Panel held presentations on: the inter-relationships between the 
global climate system, drought aad desertification, including the impact of desertification on 
clima.te change and global warming; and about desertificatioil as a threat to the conservation 
and utilization of biodiversity.[6.5] 
Allother effect of the late est.a.l)lishnlent. of t,lle IPED wa.s that  reports from the Panel made 
it to the negotia.tions a.t a sta.ge n:hen cumples scientific advice did not attract much interest. 
Two reports were delivered a t  the fourth negotiating session and a third one at  the fifth and last 
session, when negotia.tions on the sensitive finailcia1 questions were mainly being addressed on 
a, political basis behind closed doors. At t11a.t stage few delegates had the time, or the energy, 
to  assimilate inforinatioll from estensive scientific reports. To have had any significant influence 
on negotiations, this informa.tion should ha.ve been provided a t  the first or second sessions, when 
delegates were discussing the structure and eleinents to  be included in the Convention. Had 
esperts' views been a.va.ilable a.t this sta.ge, they ma.y also have had influence over how delegates 
would a.ddress the problem, since it wa.s the time of agenda setting. 
At the last negotiating session, solne delegates coilcluded that the insufficient scientific in- 
put was due to the lacli of infusion of scientific and technical espertise. They suggested tha.t 
an institution like the IPCC, wllich provided informa.tioi1 to the climate change negotiations, 
\vould ha.ve resulted in a, better balance between science a.nd politics.[GG] One delegate later 
claimed that  the INCD's lack of support froill a, large body of scientists left negotiators seri- 
ously handica1~ped,[67] and IPED ma,y have been coi~sciously designed to have low influence. 
Decision-makers who dislilied the influence of esperts on the climate change negotiation process 
hoped to a.void a similar situatioil in the C:CD ca.se and therefore set up a small expert panel 
(1.5 t,o 16 illenlbers compa.red to 1PC:Cl's 250 t,o 300 esperts). These would then not have the 
same global a.uthority as the IPCC?, but. one could on the other 1la.nd argue that  they could have 
illore influence on the Secset8a.ria.t, 1)eing a, sinall group that could easily meet. The group would 
also ha.ve fewer probleills with int,ernal organiza.tion and reaching consensus decisions. 
However, t,he core of the prol~lem in t.llis ca.se wa.s t11a.t there wa.s no esistiilg coordinated 
internat~ional community of desertifica.t,ion scient,ist,s, siiuilar to t11a.t of the clima,te change net- 
worli, that the IPED could build ~11011. Tlle 1PC;C: was created on the initiative of UNEP and 
the \,\'orld Meteorological 0rganiza.tion and had esisted for some time before the initiative to 
negotiate a convention was 11la.de. 
The influence of esperts 1va.s low on negotiations and it is liliely to rema.in low after the entry 
into force of the Convelltion (December 1996) since the manda.te of the IPED expired sis months 
a.fter the conclusion of the Convention (December 1994). The Panel has thus been unable to 
i~lfluence the interim period negotia.tions that dealt wit11 how scientific advice shall be provided 
to  the Collference of the Parties. The combination of the design of the institution for expert 
advice and esperts' ~ ~ 0 ~ 1 i i l l g  conditio~ls provides a. considerable part of the explanation as to 
rvhy esperts were ma.rginalized. 
Thus, to  conclude, several rea.sons why esperts were marginalized have been provided here. 
Some of them seen1 to espla.in why espests were illarginalized in the 1993-4 negotiations of the 
Desertification Convention. Because scientific esperts were prevented from giving advice, as the 
effect of North-South politics, and the design and \vorliing conditions of the IPED, scientific 
espertise was marginalized in the desertifica.tion negotiations. 
8. Non-scientific Expert Influence 
Sonle observers of inte~*na.tional negot~ia.tions t,elld to equate the iilstitutions of negotiating pro- 
cesses, such a.s t,lle Panel of Esperts, n-it,h t,lle individuals who participate in thein (the esperts). 
In turn, the assuinption is often ma.de that t lle group of "esperts" coilsists only of scientists. Ex- 
a,inina.tions of the role of experts in internationa.1 ellvironlnental negotiations are often confined 
to the activities of the members of t,he scientific espert group.[G8] 
The view of esperts-as-scientists is conlmon. IAThile experts often are scientists associated 
with or who hold positions a t  prestigious institutions, there are also those with knowledge 
acquired through the familiarity with the issue (which is this case could be rephrased as "locally 
ga.ined knowledge") who have issue-relevant knowledge. Thus a wider definition of expertise as 
o specicilised skill or teclzlziccrl k~zozuledye, ivhich allows the inclusion of specialists without an 
a.cademic degree but possessiilg key lino~vletlge, is more appropriate in this contest. 
It is liliely that  not only scientists ap1)ointed to the espert panel, but national delegates, 
11011-governmental represeiltatives as well as other actors may have relevant knowledge about 
the issue under negotiation. Taliillg this view mea,ns implicitly arguing that  relevant issue 
competence may not only be of a scientific character. In this case those with field experiences 
from combating dryland conditions or those who live in affected areas may provide information 
wl~ ic l~  is just as useful as scientific work. 
The conclusion is that  we sllould not only be looking for expertise in the formally appointed 
scientific espert panel, but rather for profiles of issue conlpetence which can be found in various 
a.ctor groups in a negotiation. Thus, it is interesting in this case is to contrast the low scientific 
influence with that  of other liillds of esperts. 
Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have increasingly been allowed to observe interna- 
tional negotiations, aad at  the Ea.rt11 Summit a. record number of them attended. Their presence 
does not only allow for the111 to inforin themselves, they can also provide pertinent information 
a,nd advice, sometimes directly "from tlie field7'. 
NGOs were strongly ellcouraged by the ClCD C!ha.irman and Secretariat to participate. Dur- 
ing negotiations the NGOs supported the proposal for a pa'rticipatory bottom-up approach, 
whicl~ wa.s to  remedy the laclt of illlpleillellta~tioll of the PACD, and the inclusion of that  princi- 
ple caa pa.rtly be ascribed to NC:O a.ctivities a t  the negotiations. It is also in their own interest 
to support the approach, since it coultl bring NGOs further into the process of making and 
illlplenlellting policies. Their physical presence on t,he conference floor made it possible to  follow 
t,he negotiations in deta.il and 1ol)l)y or llla,lte releva.nt sta.tements. 
Another rea.son for NGO influeilce wa.s t11a.t they constituted a fairly homogeneous group 
\\:hich could agree on joint stra.t,egies a.nd shtenlents. During the year it took to negotiate the 
ClCD they organized tliemselves in a. network, \\~hich is now operating. Le Re'seuu d'ONG sur 
lu Dksert<ficntioiz et la Sc'clzeresse is a world-wide cooperation between NGOs involved in the 
ilnplenlentation of the Convention. 
Because of their observer sta.tus, with no right to vote, NGOs have no direct influence on 
the negotiated tes t .  However, their encoura.ged pa,rticipa.tion, their presence on the conference 
floor a,nd their homogeneity, conlbined witJll an openness of the negotiating process, contributed 
to the successful influence of the NGO desertification espertise on certain issues.[G9] 
For esanlple, in Article 21, Pa.ragra.pl1 l ( d )  the CCD recommends the establishment of 
11a.tiona.l desertification funds, a, pro1)osa.l that originated with the NGOs; and the CCD also 
encourages participation of NGOs and local populations in the development of national action 
programs in Article 10, Pa.ra.gra,ph 2(f). 
Despite their limited formal position, NGOs did indeed have relatively large influence, which 
delllollstrates the possibility for a.ctors other than country delegations to  have input in the 
negotiations. The NGO influeilce thus underscores the low scientific expert influence. 
9. Conclusions 
Experts a,re often a.slied to provitle. advice to international environnlental agreements, but their 
illfluellce varies. In the negotia,tion of the Clollventioll to Combat Desertification scientific expert 
influence wa.s marginal. Alterna.tive esplallations provided here for low illfluence have to  do with 
the science of the desertification problem, the la.cli of espert interest, the politicization of expert 
a.dvice, and the design of the international institution for expert advice. After looking a t  these 
esplana,tions it wa.s found that in this ca.se the desertification experts had little influence mostly 
l~ecause espert advice became entwined in the North-South politics of the issue and because of 
the design of the institution for scientific a.dvice. 
Desertificatioil was one, if not the first, of the big international environmental issues which 
a,ttracted international public a,ttention. Wit(l1 the series of serious droughts in Africa in the six- 
ties a,ild seventies "combatting desertification" became associated with "stopping the advancing 
desert". Nulllerous developineilt a,id projects were 1a.unched to prevent this problem. When the 
issue ca.me on the iilternatiollal a.genda for the second time, in the run up to the Earth Summit, 
Africa.n countries wanted a conveiltioil for developing countries and were trying to  raise environ- 
mental developineilt aid for their continent. They were also aware of the danger of emphasizing 
the special role for Africa too strongly; other Southern countries wanted their share in the Con- 
veiltion as well. Additionally, during UNCED Northern countries argued that  desertification 
was a local problem which should not be addressed in an international convention. Despite their 
resista.nce, it wa.s decided upon the negotia.tion of a, convention and if scientists would provide 
a.dvice eillphasizing the colllplesity a.nd site-specific nature of desertification, the whole process 
could be called in question again. 
Esperts who got involved with the negotia.ting process had little chance to  influence the out- 
come, because the International Panel of Esperts on Desertification came late into the process. 
By the time the Convention wa.s to  he negot,ia.ted, issues such as the definition of the problem 
(over ~vllich experts could ha.ve 1la.d influence) were already decided on. There wa,s limited time 
t,o provide espert reports, ~vhich a.rrived too la.te in the negotiation process t o  have significant 
impa.ct on agenda. setting and thus the content,s of the Convention. The Panel may have been 
deli11era.tely designed to be a. sma.11 group ~vhich would merely serve as scientific legitiinization 
for the negotiations. I\iIoreover, t,he a.l)sence of a,a already established international networli of 
scientists ina,de it even inore difficult for the Panel to have iilfluence over the negotiations. 
1,T'hile scientific experts participa.ting in the clesertificatioil negotiation process were inarginal- 
ized, the NG 0 s '  success in tra.nsmit ting their points into the Convention, despite their lack of 
forillal influence, contra~sts with the scientific esperts' ina,rgina,l influence. It underscores that  
11011-sta.te a.ctors call influence ilegotiation outrcomes. 
This study then suggests t,l~a.t w11e11 studying the inlpact of expert advice on international 
environmental negotiations, it is important to widen the perspective from only studying scientific 
esperts appointed to espert panels, to  including ot'her a.ctors who may have issue competence 
in the matter. Actors' profiles a.re more iinporta,ilt t11a.n their formal position in a negotiation. 
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